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Mapping Supreme Court Doctrine: Civil Pleading
Scott Dodson * and Colin Starger **
ABSTRACT

This essay, adapted from the video presentation available at
http://vimeo.coml89845875, graphically depicts the genealogy and
evolution of federal civil pleading standards in U.S. Supreme Court
opinions over time. We show that the standard narrative-of a decline in
pleading liberality from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal-is complicated by
both progenitors and progeny. We therefore offer a fuller picture of the
doctrine of Rule 8 pleading that ought to be of use to judges and
practitioners in federal court. We also hope to introduce a new visual format
for academic scholarship that capitalizes on the virtues of narration,
graphics, mapping, online accessibility, and electronic dissemination.

* Professor of Law and Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, University of California
Hastings College of the Law.
** Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. We thank Tom Rowe for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
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INTRODUCTION

It is now familiar that the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombl/ and Ashcroft v. JqbaP have tightened federal civil pleading
standards. Courts and commentators reiterate a standard narrative of
relatively lax liberality from Conley v. Gibson 3 for fifty years, suddenly
tightening with Twombly and Jqbal. 4
We do not dispute the general trend of tightened pleading standards.
But we believe the simplified picture of the standard narrative is
incomplete. Other cases, often overlooked, complicate the picture
considerably.
We aim to bring those cases and complications to light by graphically
depicting the genealogy and evolution of civil pleading standards in U.S.
Supreme Court opinions over time. This essay, written for the print edition,
is adapted from our unique audio/visual presentation of the topic, S which
capitalizes on the virtues of narration, graphics, mapping, online
accessibility, and electronic dissemination. We urge readers to view and
share the video presentation.

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials
on the Merits: Rejlections of the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 286, 33135 (2013); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705-10 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we are mindful that
lower courts have not always followed the liberality of Conley, see Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433,
449-50, 492 (1986), we focus here exclusively on the standard as articulated by the Supreme
Court.
5. Scott Dodson & Colin Starger, Mapping Supreme Court Doctrine: Civil Pleading,
VlMEO.COM (Jan. 28, 2014), https:llvimeo.coml84355403.
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THE MAPPING SCHEMA

For this print version, we incorporate a graphical "doctrinal map" to
chart pleading doctrine. 6 The map plots relationships between Supreme
Court opinions on an x-y axis. The opinions themselves are represented as
triangles: Upward-pointing triangles represent cases where pleadings were
found sufficient (motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) were
unsuccessful) and downward-pointing triangles represent cases where the
pleadings were found insufficient (motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
were successful). The x-axis plots the date of an opinion, while the y-axis
plots the relative liberality of the opinion's pleading standard: the higher on
the y-axis, the more liberal the pleading standard in that opinion. The map
also shows-via arrows-the citations of one decision to another, with a
green arrow representing a favorable citation and a yellow arrow
representing a critical citation. Figure 1 shows the axes and legend:

How tb~e Map Works
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FIGURE 1
6. Our use of "doctrinal maps" grows out of earlier work by one of us in this field. See,
e.g., Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95
MARQ. L. REv. 1253 (2012); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in
the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 77 (2012); Colin Starger, A
Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins of Justice Kennedy's Majority
Opinion, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 130 (2013).
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THE SIMPLE PLEADING NARRATIVE

In this Part, we map the pleading narrative that dominates court
opinions and commentary. As we hope to show in a later Part, this narrative
is overly simplistic.
Before plotting the decisions themselves, we must layout the
backdrop of federal civil pleading. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states that a plaintiffs complaint need only set out "a short and
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.,,7
The seminal case on Rule 8 is Conley v. Gibson, which interpreted
Rule 8 merely to require a complaint to give the defendant "fair notice" of
the plaintiffs claim "and the grounds upon which it rests."g Conley
famously stated that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.,,9
Conley thus set a very liberal standard for pleading a civil claim. 10 As
long as the claimant pleads a legally recognizable claim and includes
enough facts to provide notice to the defendant, the claim should satisfy
Rule 8."
The Court decided two important cases after Conley-Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination UnU l2 and
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA.13 Each case unanimously reaffirmed and
restated the liberal Conley standard and disapproved of lower courts
attempting to set a stricter pleading standard for certain kinds of cases. 14
In 2007, however the Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,15
which abrogated Conley's "no set of facts" standard and held that the
plaintiff must go beyond mere notice to state a claim for relief that is
"plausible.,,16 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,17 the Court confirmed

7. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2). Other rules and statutes can require different pleading
standards for specific kinds of claims. See, e.g., FED. R. Cry. P. 9(b) (fraud), but because we focus
on the general pleading standard of Rule 8, we do not address unique pleading standards here.
8. 355 U.S. at 47.
9. [d. at 45-46.
10. [d.
II. See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 26-30 (2013).
Many have criticized the liberality of Conley. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No
Secrets are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665, 1685 (1998).
12. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
13. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
14. See DODSON, supra note 11, at 35-37.
15. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. [d. at 556-57,562-63.
17. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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Twombly's plausibility standard and further tightened pleadings by
directing courts to disregard conc1usory allegations. 18 Figure 2 below plots
these cases.
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FIGURE 2
Figure 2 depicts the conventional narrative of pleadings standards at the
Supreme Court level. The chart shows an unadulterated liberality from
Conley to Swierkiewicz with all upward-pointing triangles at the high end of
the liberality axis, suddenly sliding down to a stricter pleading standard
imposed by the downward-pointing triangles of Twombly and Iqbal.
Twombly, by instituting a new "plausibility" hurdle, is plotted significantly
lower on the y-axis liberality scale. Iqbal, with its rigid, transsubstantive
application of plausibility, plus its insistence that conc1usory allegations be
disregarded, is plotted even lower. 19
18, Id at 678-80.
19. We understand that "liberality" is both relative and subjective. However, we believe
the basic slide in liberality depicted here is widely accepted. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone,
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 849, 872-73 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REv. 821, 823 (2010); Miller, supra note 4, at 331-38; A.
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353,353-
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Note that, although Twombly cited to Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, it
also called them into question because both of those cases relied heavily
and largely on Conley.20 Accordingly, we have colored those arrows yellow.
Interestingly, as the map shows, Iqbal did not even cite directly to Conley,
Leatherman, or Swierkiewicz.
The most visually arresting takeaway from the map, however, is the
standard narrative: a consistent adherence to the liberal Conley pleading
standard, marked by a fairly dramatic slide to Twombly and Iqbal, with
neither case following other prior precedent.
IV.

COMPLICATING THE MAP

We hope to complicate this picture a bit by" attending to Twombly's
progenitors and progeny. We do not dispute the general trend: pleading
standards have, at least at the Supreme Court level of doctrine, tightened.
But there is more to this story than just Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal.
To begin with, Twombly did not create stricter pleading out of whole cloth.
Twombly relied on three other pleadings decisions for support.
In the first, Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State
Council ojCarpenters,21 although the Court found the conduct alleged may
have been unlawful-the claim was "insufficient as a matter oflaw,,22-the
Court opined that if the conduct had been unlawful, then a district court
could "insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.'.23
In the second, Papasan v. Allain/4 a case challenging wealth disparities
in public education, the plaintiffs alleged that the disparities deprived
schoolchildren of a minimally adequate education. 25 The Court disregarded
this allegation because, the Court said, such an allegation with "no actual

54, 359 (2010); Fowler v. UPMC Shadywide, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[P]leading
standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of
pleading ...."). But see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293,
1344-45 (2010) (making the case that Twombly and Iqbal are consistent with Conley and its
progeny).
20. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("A court may dismiss a
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set offacts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations." (emphasis added)); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993) (rejecting the need for factual
specificity under Rule 8 beyond mere notice); cf Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 ("[B]ecause Conley has
been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar
as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.").
21. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
22. /d. at 545.
23. Id.at527n.17.
24. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
25. Id. at 273-74.
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facts" alleged in support was merely "a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.,,26
In the third, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,27 the Court held that
a plaintiff pleading federal securities fraud must allege some factual
description of the economic loss and its causal connection. 28 Otherwise, the
Court predicted, "a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim" could force an
unjust settlement without "a reasonably founded hope that the discovery
process will reveal relevant evidence.,,29
Instead of Leatherman or Swierkiewicz, Twombly relied on each of
these three cases to justify its doctrinal conclusion. Twombly cited Papasan
to disregard the allegation of a conspiracy as merely a legal conclusion. 30
And, citing Associated General and Broudo, Twombly emphasized the need
for additional facts before allowing a claim without a reasonably founded
hope of evidentiary support to impose discovery costs or force an unjust
settlement. 3 ! Figure 3 below shows the complications of the progenitors of
Twombly.

26. Id. at 286.
27. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
28. See id. at 346.
29. Id. at 347 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741
(1975)). Although federal statutory law sets a specific pleading standard for certain elements of
securities fraud, the Court analyzed the pleading issue in Broudo under Rule 8(a)(2).
30. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478
U. S. 265,286 (1986)).
31. Id. at 557-62.
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FIGURE 3
In addition to these oft-overlooked early cases, there is a blip in the
middle. Erickson v. Pardus,32 decided just after Twombly, seemed to apply
a more lenient pleading standard to a pro se prisoner suit,33 which is why
Figure 4 below plots it higher up on the y-axis. But, in that case, the
allegations easily satisfied even Twombly's plausibility standard. And pro
se plaintiffs are historically given some leniency in pleading?4 Further,
Iqbal, the case right after Erickson, continued the downward trend in
pleading liberality, and it relied heavily on Twombly without even
mentioning Erickson. In fact, Erickson has not been cited by any other
opinion in our map. As Figure 4 shows, Erickson is just a red herring.

32.
33.
34.

551 U.S. 89 (2007).
Id.at93-94.
SeeDODSON,supranote 11,at61-62.
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FIGURE 4

The final complication that we introduce to the map comprises the postIqbal cases, which seem to show a bit of genuine uptick in pleading
liberality.
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,35 a unanimous Court
reaffirmed the plausibility-pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal but
nevertheless held that the relatively bare allegations satisfied that
standard. 36 And, in Skinner v. Switzer/ 7 the Court favorably cited
Swierkiewicz (and did not cite Twombly or IqbaT) in upholding the
complaint. 38 Figure 5-the final map-adds these cases.

35.
36.
37.
38.

131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
Id. at l322-23.
131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
Id. at 1296.
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FIGURES
These cases do not retract the Twiqbal standard-to the contrary, their
language tends to entrench it-but they do offer data points that could be
seen as less strict. All told, then, our map shows a more complicated-and
perhaps quite unfinished-picture of civil pleading standards as set out by
the Supreme Court.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this very brief essay, we have graphically mapped civil pleading
standards as articulated by the Supreme Court. We hope readers will view,
and share, the more accessible video presentation from which this written
essay is adapted. In the meantime, we look forward to the Court's next
pronouncement.

